GOD JUL!!!

Ännu en gång (5e i raden!) får Teater Olydig Kulturproduktion, och ensemble äran att önska er alla en riktigt God Jul och ett ännu mer fantastiskt 2011!

Följ gärna denna blogg, om du vill...

Projekt FAS 4

Under de sista flämtande dagarna nu i december, färdigställs Teater Olydig-projektet FAS 4. Premiären beräknas till mitten av april 2011, och repstart är under januari.
I föreställningen medverkar:
Anneli Bexelius
Charlotte Annas
Bernd Briese

Mer info kommer inom kort!

WE ALL ARE WikiLeaks

FÖR ATT SPEGLA WIKILEAKS:

Lägg upp ett eget valt dokument från denna sida:

http://213.251.145.96/classification/1_0.html

.................
Nytt dokument för dagen:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RIO DE JANEIRO 000365

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/11/09
TAGS: SOCI SNAR PGOV ASEC BR
SUBJECT: RIO WEIGHS OPTIONS FOR NEXT FAVELA PACIFICATION

REF: RIO DE JANEIRO 329; RIO DE JANEIRO 346;

RIO DE JANEIRO 353 RIO DE JAN 00000365 001.2 OF 002 CLASSIFIED BY: Dennis W. Hearne, Principal Officer; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

SUMMARY

¶1. (C) On October 29, the Superintendent for Operational Planning from Rio's State Security Secretariat said Rio Governor Sergio Cabral would decide by the end of November whether to "pacify" five less populated, lower-threat favela communities or focus on one largely populated, higher-threat favela by the end of the year. According to Alzir, the Favela Pacification Program's strategic plan envisions the pacification of 131 favela communities over the next five years, and would do so by increasing Pacification Police Unit (UPP) personnel from 500 to 12,000. Alzir stated increasing police recruitment was critical to making the five year horizon viable, and said Rio state would be seeking federal funding to increase police salaries. End Summary.

RIO AUTHORITIES WEIGH OPTIONS FOR NEXT FAVELA PACIFICATION

¶2. (C) Rio state and police authorities will decide the next target(s) for the Favela Pacification Program (FPP) in the coming weeks. During an October 29 meeting with consulate officers to lay out the FPP strategy and time-line, Roberto Alzir, Superintendent for Operational Planning from Rio's State Security Secretariat, said Rio de Janeiro Governor Sergio Cabral would decide by the end of the November whether to "pacify" five less populated, lower-threat favela communities or focus on one largely populated, higher-threat favela by the end of the year. Four other favelas with some 90,000 residents are currently pacified, i.e. mostly free of gang activity and with the population accessible for city services and social assistance (Note: As reported in reftel A, the "pacification" of a favela community involves state police special operations units (BOPE) first entering a favela by force. Once criminal elements that control a favela are purged, state-administered Pacification Police Unit (UPP) officers then replace traditional police forces, in order to maintain order, foster long-term ties between the state and the community, and assist with the delivery of basic services to the favela. End Note.)

RIO'S FAVELAS PACIFIED IN FIVE YEARS TIME?

¶3. (C) FPP objectives encompass over 100 favela communities, using 12,000 UPP officers, within a target time horizon of five years. According to Alzir, the FPP strategic plan envisions the pacification of 131 favela communities, with a total affected population of approximately 780,000 residents - including the key, drug gang-controlled favelas Complexo de Alemao, Rocinha, and Complexo de Mare. He said this goal would normally take 13-15 years to achieve, but the Rio government sought to accomplish the objective within five years. In order to do so, security officials plan to increase the number of UPP officers - the centerpiece of the FPP strategy - to 12,000, as well as increase overall Military Police (MP) numbers to 55,000 by 2016. (Note: UPP ranks currently number only 500 officers, of a total of 36,000 MP men and women. End Note).

¶4. (C) Alzir stated increasing police recruitment was critical to making the five year horizon viable, and said Rio state would be seeking federal funding to increase police salaries (Note: Standard MP officer monthly salary is approximately 1,000 Brazilian Reals, or 600 USD. UPP officers earn an additional 500 Brazilian Reals, or 300 USD, paid for by the Rio municipal government. End Note.) Stating, "The state does not have enough money," Alzir explained the Rio state government was asking for federal assistance to cover the increase (amount unspecified) until 2016, when the state would assume the additional amount.

CRITERIA FOR SELECTION

RIO DE JAN 00000365 002.

2 OF 002 5. (C) In selecting favelas for pacification, state and police authorities weigh location, strategic impact, tactical terrain, and resource requirements, with final approval coming from the Governor. Showing consulate officers a satellite image of a pacified favela's radius of gunfire reach, extending well into Rio's famed Copacabana neighborhood and beach area, Alzir explained the FPP's goal was to prioritize favelas adjacent to concentrated tourist areas. In selecting favelas for pacification, security officials first gather intelligence to develop a comprehensive profile for each community, crafting tactical maps that show primary access and escape routes, known drug gang hideouts and strongholds, and key civilian points, such as schools and churches. Authorities also weigh the strategic impact of a pacification. They analyze this information against manpower and resources available, and draw up a list of suitable target favelas. The Governor, with recommendations from the MP Police Chief and State Secretary for Security, then selects the community.

¶6. (C) Alzir explained his biggest concern about the FPP was losing progress due to change of governments. "We need the next state government to pursue this, to continue with this commitment," That said, Alzir expressed optimism that Rio's hosting of the 2016 Olympics will make state, local, and federal authorities "move forward, faster" on favela pacification.

COMMENT

¶7. (SBU) While Alzir did not specifically name the Complexo de Alemao - controlled by the Comando Vermelho (Red Command) drug faction - as the large, high-threat candidate for pacification by year's end, it is likely the principal stronghold Rio authorities have their sights on. Rio State Secretary for Security Jose Mariano Beltrame told Principal Officer on September 22 this favela was the "epicenter of the fight," and stated a pacification operation would take place there in early 2010 (reftel A). On October 17, Comando Vermelho gunmen shot down a police helicopter, killing four officers (reftel B), and, in retaliation, MP tactical raids since targeted 14 Comando Vermelho-controlled favelas. Given that any police operation into Complexo de Alemao would be "traumatic" in terms of scale of violence, however, it is unlikely that the Rio security apparatus would be prepared to launch an operation into Complexo de Alemao before the December holidays and February Carnival festivities.

¶8. (SBU) Whether Rio's next step involves a high-profile operation in Complexo de Alemao or the pacification of smaller, easier-to-secure favelas, we anticipate continued unintended consequences, such as those reported in reftel C. In yet another example of such consequences, a neighborhood association from the affluent Leme neighborhood recently met with State Security Secretary Beltrame to complain about the expansion of the Babilonia-Chapeu Mangueira favela - one of Rio's four pacified favela communities - that borders Leme. According to the neighborhood association, the new-found stability in this favela is attracting squatters from other areas, resulting in a flurry of hastily - and illegally - constructed new abodes and rising crime rates in the neighborhood. We will continue to monitor and report on such developments, as well as how ongoing FPP operations bear on Rio's overall security, commercial, and social environment. End Comment.

Frihetskamp! Vi är Wikileaks!

Här väljer vi att publicera ett av de hemligstämplade dokument Wikileaks släppte för några dagar sedan. Urvalet är helt slumpmässigt.
----

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000706

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO/UNP, PRM/AF AND DRL/NESCA
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: PBTS PHUM ECON PREF WI AG MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA REALITIES

REF: RABAT 0693

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Although the Western Sahara negotiations
have now re-started (Reftel), the conflict is 34 years old.
The Government of Morocco (GOM) has invested tremendous
resources in the territory, and some observers estimate that
it spends USD 2.7 billion per year on the territory and its
385,000 residents. The level of development and of social
services clearly exceeds the level in Morocco proper.
Significant voter participation )- despite a Polisario call
for a boycott -- in the June 12 local elections may be a sign
that support for independence is waning although support for
self-government is real. Serious human rights abusers have
been transferred, and respect for human rights in the
territory has greatly improved, reaching the same plane as in
Morocco. However, advocating independence is still a red
line, and the GOM refuses to register pro-Polisario NGOs.
Giving the territory more autonomy, improving
Algerian-Moroccan relations, enhancing regional integration,
building real confidence, and addressing all parties,
propaganda seem essential to resolving the conflict. End
Summary.

¶2. (C) Since King Hassan II launched the Green March in
1975, the Western Sahara issue has been intimately linked to
the stability of the throne and Morocco itself. Hassan,
twice victim of coup attempts and for years at war with the
left, used Western Sahara to bolster nationalism and park his
army far away in the desert. More recently, however, that
link has blurred. King Mohammed VI is more secure,
maintained in power more by love than fear and facing no
apparent major domestic threat. He recently has somewhat
distanced himself from the issue, however, and has not
visited the territory in three years, a stark contrast to his
peripatetic ribbon cutting throughout the Kingdom.

¶3. (C) The GOM continues to subsidize the territory and
provide tax and duty exemptions that form the base of much of
the private fortunes there (mostly key clans loyal to the
throne and a few senior military). Despite some siphoning,
the investment has produced higher levels of urban
development than in comparably sized cities in Morocco proper
and made the capital, Laayoune, the first city without any
shantytowns. Social indicators such as access to and level
of education and availability of health care and social
facilities exceed Moroccan norms and far surpass those in
comparably sized Morocco,s cities. Growth in Morocco has
made these expenditures much more bearable to Rabat,s
exchequer than they once were.

¶4. (SBU) In April 2009, a local weekly newsmagazine TelQuel
published an article laying out and likely even exaggerating
what the Sahara was costing Morocco. TelQuel claimed that
the GOM has spent 1.2 trillion dirhams on the territory since
1975 and is spending 3 percent of GDP or USD 2.7 billion per
year, including the funds to maintain two-thirds of the Royal
Armed Forces in Western Sahara. (Note: TelQuel faced no
consequences for the article. Even with the relative
expansion of the freedom of the press in Morocco to cover
subjects formerly taboo, this was astonishing. End Note.)

¶5. (C) In the June 12 local elections, &First Friend8
Fouad Ali el Himma,s Party of Authenticity and Modernity
(PAM) challenged local Laayoune strongman and Royal
Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) head
Kalihenna Ould er Rachid. The PAM lost, despite having an el
Himma protege installed. The Ould er Rachid family and clan
control the Tammany Hall-like Istiqlal party machine that has
run the territory for many years, and played a major part in
winning the Prime Minister,s chair for party head Abbas El
Fassi. Voter participation in the Sahara, stoked by clan
rivalries, was far above the norm, despite a
Polisario-declared boycott. Some pro-independence Sahrawis
reportedly voted for the Ould er Rachid because they alone
were deemed strong enough to stand up to the government in
Rabat. This real political competition, while perhaps not
democracy, seems far more open than the Cuba-like Polisario
system. It underscores the fact that there is a significant
part of the population of the Sahrawi territory, in addition
to most immigrants, who support Moroccan sovereignty.

¶6. (C) After it took control of Western Sahara, Morocco
tried to affect any vote by promoting immigration by its
nationals, who now are well over half of the some 385,000
residents of the territory. Perhaps half of the immigrants,
however, were themselves Sahrawis, from areas just north of
the dividing line that were also home to some of the most
nationalistic Sahrawis. In a referendum that could include
independence, they are not seen by the GOM as reliable
voters, partly explaining GOM reluctance to go to a vote.
(Comment: Curiously, we know of no advocate of independence
that has ever claimed the &Sahrawi8 territories in Morocco,
Algeria or Mauritania as part of a national homeland,
although some members of the CORCAS unsuccessfully tried to
include the Moroccan parts in the autonomous region, when it
was first proposed. The absence of such larger nationalism,
along with the Polisario,s 1970,s war against Mauritania
--the world,s only Sahrawi state -- suggest the conflict is
less nationalist than geopolitical, linked to the much older
dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the
case for an independent state. End Comment.)

¶7. (C) Given the small population at stake, Spain,s
granting of Spanish nationality, with the possibility of
migrating to Spain, its nearby Canary Islands or elsewhere in
Europe, is significant, and, indeed in better times,
resettlement could be a simple way of resolving the plight of
the refugees.

-----------
Who Counts?
-----------

¶8. (C) The UN process recognizes the parties in the
negotiations as Morocco and the Polisario. This asymmetry
makes any resolution difficult, as it does not recognize the
determinative role of Algiers, which the Moroccans see as
their real adversary in this dispute. It also neglects the
diverse views among the Sahrawis.

--------------------------------------------- -
Human Rights: Progress but Continuing Paranoia
--------------------------------------------- -

¶9. (U) The human rights situation in the territory has
dramatically improved since a brief &intifada8 in 2005.
Like Morocco itself, Western Sahara has come a very long way
from the mass disappearances of the &years of lead8 during
Hassan II,s reign. Pro-Polisario Sahrawis are able to
organize under the rubric of human rights activists, which
most of them legitimately pursue, such as last year,s RFK
award winner, Aminatou Haidar from the Sahrawi Collective of
Human Rights Defenders (CODESA). In just over a year,
restrictions on their international travel have disappeared.

¶10. (C) Since mid-2008, once common beatings and arbitrary
imprisonment have also essentially ceased. One key to the
reduction in abuses last year was the transfer of
long-serving security officials with consistent records as
abusers. Activists and officials confirmed in July 2009 that
more transfers (many by promotion) had recently taken place,
and most well known abusers are reportedly now gone. All
sources report the territory is quiet, with residents hopeful
for some political progress.

¶11. (C) What opponents of Morocco cannot do is explicitly
organize in favor of independence or a referendum thereon,
nor can they publish or even distribute tracts on the
subject. In addition, they are denied by the government the
right to operate as legal entities. Establishing these
rights would not only be just, but would help build
confidence in a consensual solution that would involve
re-integration. The Sahrawi Association of Human Rights
Victims (ASVDH) has even obtained court approval for its
registration as an NGO and won on appeal lodged by the
Interior Ministry (MOI), but has not been able to get local
officials to accept its registration. The USG has pushed for
this for some time. We recently heard that the local Wali
has proposed to MOI that it accept the registration but the
decision is pending. We should press the GOM on this both
here and in Washington.

¶12. (C) Despite this substantial progress, which leaves the
human rights situation in Western Sahara nearly equivalent to
Morocco, Morocco campaigned for most of the year and spent
scarce diplomatic capital in a successful effort to push back
proposals for the UN to have a monitoring role on this issue.
It is possible that they have understood the opportunity
costs of that strategy and appear more recently to have been
somewhat less vocal on the issue.

--------------------
What the People Want
--------------------

¶13. (C) Extensive interviews and independent sources in the
territory suggest that the principal goal of most Sahrawis is
more self-government than self-determination; a desire more
for protection and identity than independence, an army and
embassies. The small vocally pro-Polisario minority,
including many of the human rights activists, formerly
enjoyed the support of the &silent majority8 of these
Sahrawis, particularly during periods of repression.
Development and reduced oppression have reduced this support.
The Sahrawi &silent majority8 in the territory has been
intrigued by the prospect of autonomy and has generally
quietly awaited its development. Recently, a pro-Polisario
activist, when asked, confided to us that he believed that in
a free election held now a majority of voters in the
territory would choose autonomy.

-----------------------------
On the Other Side of the Berm
-----------------------------

¶14. (C) While not the competent Mission to comment on the
Polisario or the camps, Embassy Rabat understands the
situation for the refugees in Tindouf is difficult but
support for the Polisario appears strong. Nevertheless, we
hear from credible Sahrawis that there is growing interest
there in a negotiated solution, belying the stories of
unrealistic saber-rattling, frequently attributed to Sahrawi
youth. GOM calls for a census and audit of international
programs seem reasonable to us. Finally, if there is no
prospect of a solution, re-settlement should be considered an
option. The Spanish decision in 2008 to accord passports to
1975 residents of its former colony could be implemented in
Tindouf as it has been in Laayoune (but not in the current
economic climate).

-------------------
Frozen Negotiations
-------------------

¶15. (C) Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General,s Personal
Envoy for Western Sahara has struggled to get the UN
negotiations back on track. The negotiation process
re-started in 2007, after Morocco tabled a proposal for
autonomy that had been carefully negotiated with the Bush
Administration. The main impetus to getting the plan
produced was then-USUN Permrep John Bolton,s threat (October
2006) to end MINURSO,s mandate. When first released, the
USG called the autonomy proposal &serious and credible.8
In substance, the proposal was serious, including local
police and some independence for the judiciary, and was
accompanied by a declared willingness to negotiate. It was
also viewed as credible by the international community,
including explicitly Russia and implicitly China, which
nearly universally expressed a willingness to accept this as
a possible outcome, if agreed. Credibility was an issue,
however, among Sahrawis on both sides of the berm, as there
was little confidence, given past Moroccan evasions, that
even if agreed, the GOM would implement the plan. This
credibility gap has narrowed, but only slightly, due to the
improvements in the human rights situation. Credibility is,
therefore, key to winning hearts and minds.

¶16. (C) In April 2007, the United Nations Security Council
lengthened the mandate of MINURSO to 12 months (from six) and
the &Manhasset talks8 (named after the Long Island, New
York town where they were held) began. The Moroccans, while
negotiating with the Polisario, showed them no credence and
sent Moroccan Sahrawis to seek defectors. CORCAS head
Kalihenna questioned the Polisario,s right to be there. The
Polisario broke diplomatic and Middle Eastern protocol by
refusing to shake hands with the Sahrawis on the Moroccan
delegation and walked out or turned away when they spoke.

¶17. (C) Neither side offered any compromise or considered
the arguments of the other. This was hardened when, at the
end of 2007, King Mohammed VI publicly instructed his
delegation to discuss no solution but autonomy, creating
little room for discussion. This hard-line stance may have
been bolstered by what was perceived in the Palace as
uncritical support from Washington. In the end, there was no
result after four rounds of rotating restatement of static
positions. Former UN Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum cited
immovable Moroccan commitment to retain sovereignty, and
called the prospect of independence unrealistic. For this
unusual frankness, the UN let Van Walsum go, at Algerian and
Polisario insistence.

¶18. (C) The new Personal Envoy, Ambassador Christopher Ross,
long one of the stars of U.S. diplomacy in the region, seems
better positioned than anyone to budge President Bouteflika
and his government. In recognition, he was granted the
additional mandate to help improve Moroccan-Algerian
relations. King Mohammed VI took note of this and conveyed
through Ross an offer of unconditional, at-any-level and
on-any-subject, bilateral talks. Ross did get Algeria to
agree to go to the &informals8 but only as observers. He
got no response on the bilateral issue, although it is still
early in Bouteflika,s new term. The informal meeting this
month in Vienna has at least re-launched the negotiations.

--------------------------------------------- --------
Regional Link: Algeria-Morocco Key to Sahara Solution
--------------------------------------------- --------

¶19. (C) Algeria and Morocco are demographically similar but
with differences in historical experience that go back
hundreds of years. About a year after Algeria,s hard-won
independence, it and Morocco fought &The War of the Sands,8
over their then-disputed frontier, drawn by colonial France.
In 1975, when the Algerians sheltered the Polisario, it was
at least as much a reflection of their historical rivalry as
ideological support for a fellow liberation movement. King
Hassan II managed to work out a frontier agreement with the
Algerians which the GOM maintains has been ratified, and
needs only an exchange of instruments of ratification. The
subsequent closure of the Algeria-Moroccan border is now an
anomaly in a Mediterranean region of growing links. There
have been modestly growing functional links in recent years,
much of it under Arab Maghreb Union auspices and in 2008 some
technical agreements were signed. But direct high-level
communication remains cut and both quiet and public GOM
overtures to reopen it have been rebuffed. The Government of
Algeria (GOA) turned down then-Secretary Rice,s invitation
for a trilateral ministerial meeting on the margins of the
2008 UNGA.

-------
Comment
-------

¶20. (C) Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara dispute is a
chicken and egg situation. Algeria has indicated relations
cannot improve until there is self-determination in Western
Sahara. Morocco, following the close links between the
Polisario leadership and their Algerian hosts, remains
convinced that there will be no agreement if relations with
Algiers do not improve. In response, as of June 2009, the
Moroccans have maintained that their principal goal now is
rapprochement with Algeria, which could be discussed
separately.

¶21. (C) The international community is ready to support
Maghreb rapprochement and integration, which can only occur
in parallel with a settlement of the longstanding dispute
over the Western Sahara and resettlement of the
long-suffering refugees. Then-President Putin of Russia
urged Algerian-Moroccan compromise in vain, as have the
French, the Spanish, and the USG. We are not aware of any of
the P-5 opposing an autonomy-based solution, nor have we seen
real urgency or priority for the international community to
resolve a dispute over which there has been no real fighting
for 18 years. End Comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

Jag är Wikileaks!!!

http://www.wikileaks.nl/mass-mirror.html

Spegel spegel på väggen där, säg vem är det som talar SANNING här?

Hjälp till att spegla Wikileaks - på bloggar, inlägg och hemsidor! Låt Wikileaks leva!

www.liberaldemokraterna.com

Är du lite frihetsälskande? Kanske tillomed lite liberal? Jamendåså, vad väntar du på? Joina vår grupp på Facebook!

UPPROP - I am Spartacus!

Vi vill ha ett fritt Internet!

Härmed uppmanar vi Dig att sprida denna länk vidare:
http://ligator.wordpress.com/2010/12/05/wikileaks-i-am-spartacus/

Vi ska låta Wikileaks leva! Ett fritt Internet i en frihetsberövad värld behövs! Människan är född olydig...

Och vad är det som händer med Olydig - egentligen???

Jaa, DET kan man verkligen fråga sig...

Det förändrar sig, rör på sig och utvecklas. Lite stillsamt har det varit det senaste halvåret, men nu ska vi förhoppningsvis kunna dra igång igen.

PRAKTISK INFO: Teater Olydig består idag av följande individer - Malin Westberg (konstnärlig ledare samt ordförande i föreningen), Nicklas Westberg (musiker, skådespelare och styrelseledamot), Daniel Nilsson (ljud/ljusteknik, komposition och styrelseledamot), Charlotte Annas (skådespelare och styrelseledamot), Anneli Bexelius (skådespelare), Tobias Bexelius (regissör) samt Bernt Briese (skådespelare). Teater Olydig befinner sig fortfarande i Sverige! Basen är Stockholm och kommande produktioner spelas i första hand inom staden.
En ny "avdelning" till Olydig befinner sig under utveckling i Belgien. Vi kallar denna del för Disobedient. Där är det Nicklas Westberg som är ansvarig för den gemensamma rörelsen framåt. Malin jobbar parallellt med båda grupperna, främst med skriveriet just nu...

Under våren 2011 kommer en ny produktion ur Olydigs repertoar, som fn går under arbetsnamnet FilippaK... Mer om detta längre fram :-)

För info och frågor, hör av er via mejlen!!! Adress: info@teaterolydig.se

Så, vad ni än fått höra; vad ni är tror - Teater Olydig är här för att stanna!
Så länge Sverige fortsätter att fucka upp livet för kulturarbetare, scenkonstnärer och andra teaterapor så finns vi!
Så länge svenska politiker tror att de kan pissa på folk som står längre ner på den socioekonomiska skalan så finns vi!
Så länge Stockholms scenkonst fortsätter sparka in öppna dörrar och spela teater som är PK så finns vi!

Och risken är väl att vi finns kvar på marknaden tills dess solen brunnit upp...

Sök oss på nätet, Facebook och i bloggar - våra rop till Dig som medmänniska och konstälskare kommer aldrig att tystna! Scenen och nätet är vår megafon - och ingen kan ta det från oss!

TEATER OLYDIG has gone DISOBEDIENT

LOOKING FOR SOMETHING NEW?

So, finally in België. It took about three weeks to restore our selves to a normal level of living again, but now we're back in business!

Teater Olydig is still going strong. We are planning and working with the play "Nässelparadis", a script about life and death and the (in Sweden) big discussion about euthanasia. We are exploring this question at present and will return sooner or later with more information about our work.

Disobedient are looking for semi-pro actors/actresses, or other talented stage performancers, in Belgium!

WHY is a play, depending on its musicparts, about John Lennon and Yoko Ono and their love for eachother and the art.
The opening night are 8th of December 2010, the anniversary day of the killing of John Lennon. This year it's actually 30 years since Mark Chapman pulled the trigger...

The Mark Chapman-part is already occupied, but we are looking for Yoko, John, various people around them, house habitants and musicians.

To get in touch with Disobedient, please e-mail us at info@disobedient.eu or give us a call at 09-3368043 A.S.A.P

Premiär till hösten

Då var det dags att sparka igång arbetet igen och vakna upp ur vinterdvalan. Produktionsmöte på lunchrestaurang i city med Anneli Bexelius och Charlotte Annas (och lilla Noni nyvaken) och vi bestämmer att förarbetet till höstens produktion ska bli klart under våren. Vi bestämmer datum för premiär innan sommaren drar igång. Eftersom vi alla är mammor och bor på skilda håll måste mycket av researchen ligga fritt och under helt eget ansvar. Ramberättelsen ska vara klar i mitten av april och vi ska alla jobba självständigt med detta. Sedan ska det sammanfogas...
Det blir spännande.

Spännande är också Disobedients uppvaknande. Vi kämpar på och nya bloggen är uppe http://disobedientblogg.blogspot.com/

Varmt välkommen dit!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KVwx_dTtqug

Ja, jag la mig i den heta debatten som rasade i typ 48 timmar... Ekots "nyhet" om sexuella trakasserier i teaterbranschen blev en gigantskandal på kultursidorna över hela Sverige. Vilket litet futtigt land vi lever i...
Och en väninna till mig, i branschen, som jag delar många av mina egna uppfattningar med hamnade i en offerroll som inte klädde henne nämnvärt. Just det är så symptomatiskt med svensk mediarapportering. De letar alltid "ansiktet" på "offret", på "förövaren". Och denna gång var det min väninnas tur. Min fråga är då, följdaktligen, om hon vill framstå som offer, egentligen? Det tror inte jag var meningen från början. Jag tror hon vill peka på de problem hon, och andra, uppenbarligen har upplevt i sitt yrkesutövande.
Men, teatern är ingen plats för de kräsmagade, eller nervklena. Teatern kräver sårbara, vakna, diciplinerade och samvetsgranna individer för att utvecklas. Personer som sätter konsten över sig själva och låter sin själ och sin kropp vara ett instrument, ett verktyg, i sökandet efter det konstnärliga uttrycket. Vi har inte rätt att svika konsten! Och om det kostar oss något, om vår moral emellanåt måste sättas på skam, så må så vara.

Jag förutsätter att vi konstnärer är vuxna, ansvarstagande människor i mitt resonemang här nu. Jag förutsätter oxå att vi är medvetna om när vi felar individuellt och när vi handlar utifrån vårt kollektiva samvete.

Om vi, oavsett kön eller ålder, hamnar i en situation där vi upplever oss kränkta - varför säger vi inte ifrån högt och ljudligt? Vad är det i oss som lägger munkavle i stunden? Vad kan hända?
I DN Kultur idag (19/2 2010) publiceras ett öppet brev till redaktionen från Lena Endre. Den texten sätter pricken över i:et. www.dn.se/kultur
Hursomhelst, det finns en aspekt till - frånsett slemiga gubbar på höga positioner, eller småkåta kulturtanter i 50+åldern - Vi har även unga kvinnor och unga män med siktet inställt på stora eller viktiga roller, säkra anställningar och månadslöner som gör precis vad som helst för att nå sina mål. Att "gå över lik" var ett uttryck som jag lärde mig i tidig ålder; att "armbåga sig fram" ett annat. Och alla vet att det finns de som "knullat sig till roller" och de som ropat "sexuella övergrepp" när de inte nått dit de velat.
Själv råkade jag ut för en klapp i baken vid ett tillfälle, fräste ifrån och därefter hände det aldrig igen. Jag vet inte om det, eller något annat, låg till grund för att jag senare inte nådde den dåvarande position som jag strävade efter karriärmässigt. Men det skiter jag i.
Jag är där nu i alla fall. Och frågan borde istället vara om jag hade nått dit tidigare genom att acceptera klappen och kanske annat med?
Jag har även under repetitionsprocessen använt mig av övningar och metoder som i "vanliga fall" kanske skulle anses märkliga, suspekta och kanske för individen kränkbara - men ingen skådespelare har någonsin "tigit och lidit" utan alltid meddelat mig var gränsen gått. Heder åt dessa skådespelare i så fall, för de verkar tillhöra undantagen hela skrået gemensamt!
Vid ett tillfälle har ett "övergrepp" skett, utanför min kontroll ska tilläggas, av mindre art och detta togs upp vid ett trepartssamtal, samt inom ensemblen. Därefter ansåg vi alla att produktionen skulle sättas över detta och vi genomförde vårt arbete som de sanna konstnärerna vi är.

Väl mött i dag.
M

freestyling...

FÖRST & FRÄMST: Gå genast och se Bouffonteaterns föreställning "Axel von Fersen under bilan" (http://www.bouffonteatern.com/) En alldeles underbar commediaföreställning som får dig att frusta och vråla av skratt! Vissa moment är en rak spark i magen på etablissemangets godtycklighet!

FUNDERINGAR:

Så har januari passerat - det har ju knappast gått omärkt förbi. Fruktansvärt kallt hela tiden. I Linköping har det visst varit den kallaste vintern sedan 1942. Då väntade min mormor barn. Gravid i 8e månaden. Maken till sjöss och ransoneringskort. Europa stod i brand.

Det händer saker utanför vårt fönster. Utanför vår stad. Utanför vår kultur. Jag vet inte om vi har hajjat det ännu, men det finns faktiskt andra samhällen där livet och konsten tas på allvar. Där man uppskattar konstnärer eftersom man vet att de är oumbärliga. Där man föredrar att leva varje dag här och nu, istället för att satsa på pensionens gröna dagar.

I Sverige väljer medborgare av alla de slag att ta kulturen och konsten för given. Politiker, tjänstemän och även utövarna själva väljer aktivt att bidra till denna uppfattning. Det ger dem en trygghet. De har sitt på det torra i alla fulla fall. Deras pension är tryggad. Och därmed deras framtida liv. Nuet, det skiter vi i!

Min mormor är död nu. Hon dog för ett par år sedan. Kanske var det förra året, jag minns inte. Det gör fortfarande för ont för att minnas exakt år. För vi kommer att mötas igen, sen när tiden är slut för mig med. Jag hoppas det dröjer lite.

Min mormor hade inte mycket i pension. Och inte levde hon särskilt mycket heller. Hon var ganska rädd, vad jag kan minnas. Rädd för människor, rädd för att störa. Jag hoppas hon är modigare nu.

Vi får inte låta rädslan ta över oss. Vår tid här på jorden är så kort. Vi måste våga vara raka, föränderliga och toleranta. Rädslan förintar alla våra goda sidor. Att acceptera att leva under hot är att acceptera sin egen själs död. Det kan vi inte göra med oss själva!

Därför måste 2010 bli ett år då vi - Teater Olydig och Disobedient - uppmanar våra kollegor i Sverige, i Belgien och övriga Europa att vägra rädslan. Friskt vågat, hälften vunnet!

Hepp hepp!